We are facing DNS amplification DDoS attack. It relates mainly to the availability of services on the server Uvirt34 from abroad. It may also refer to some clients connected via Vodafone CZ. It turns out that the past investment in the network pays off, except for this one server on which the foreign conettivity is limited not affected by any other services of our clients. We will inform you about the situation here and on our Facebook pages.
Dear customers, We apologize for the extraordinary downtime of our services, which occurred on 24.10.2013. The outage was due to a complete failure of air conditioning by the data center operator Ce Colo and ran from 22:30 to 23:30 and concerned a number of other customers in this data center. Our engineers managed to restore the operation of all affected services very quickly. Thank you for your understanding.
Dear customers, at night from Saturday 19.10. On Sunday 20.10. (22:00-6:00) We will be migrating to a new SAN switch. With these switches, we ensure continuous function of the SAN network even in case of failure of the entire power branch or multiple phases. We continue to increase the resilience of our services against power outages. The Switche also increases the SAN spine throughput to 40Gbps and provides 10Gbps connectivity for our powerful storage servers. In addition to increasing throughput and redundancy, the latency of IO operations is also reduced. We do not assume that there is a major outage during the migration, however, the durability test for the downtime of the SAN infrastructure (failover) can cause short-term unavailability of web hosting and mail services, in the order of tens of seconds. We apologize for any complications and thank you for your understanding.
Dear Customers,
On Saturday 17. August from 10:15 to 10:32 there was an unexpected power outage in our data center which was caused by a defect on the data center operator's side and which unfortunately touched most of our services. According to the data center operator's observations, the function of one of the UPS circuit breakers, which was not properly configured at the time of the work, occurred during planned electrical installation maintenance. This specific error has caused that, at other times, reliably functioning measures for continuous power supply (diesel aggregates, UPS, power supply using two independent branches) have failed. Our engineers started to work immediately after the restoration of the electricity supply, half of the services were in operation immediately, the commissioning of other services required manual intervention and therefore proceeded gradually. Shortly before 13:00, the operation was resumed from more than 95%, the operation was fully restored shortly after 15:00. Some parts of our platform did not boot properly after an unexpected hard reboot or did not boot up at all and needed to be repaired or replaced by a backup HW directly on site. For example, in the SAN infrastructure, the connection between the servers and the data store has suddenly been interrupted. After such a situation, there was a need for gradual manual intervention on the individual systems so that the services were hired without damaging the stored data. Before 16:00 we removed the complication in retrieving data into the customer center. The time evolution of the restoration of the operation of our services after this power outage in the data center documents the graph of our data traffic.
A sudden power outage also caused a hardware defect on our telephone panel and therefore we were forced to provide a makeshift dial-up connection to our support team. On Sunday, 18. 8. In 11:00 the panel was fully restored. Our services managed to stabilize technicians in a relatively short time and from Saturday afternoon they are again available in the usual quality. Although the cause of the outage was not an error on the ACTIVE 24 side, we do not take this experience lightly. We have thoroughly analysed the progress of the outage, its impact on customers and the possibilities of prevention in the future, and we have adopted a set of measures that would better protect our customers in similar situations. We immediately informed about the downtime on this site, which is intended for similar situations and which we have previously informed you. If the ACTIVE 24 standard communication channels are not available, we recommend that you monitor this website for the most up-to-date information. We publish more information in our Customer centre and on the Facebook page. Dear customers, once again we apologize for the inconvenience and thank you for your understanding.
Dear customers, We apologize for the extraordinary downtime of some Web presentations on Windows servers, which occurred on 9. 5. 2013 in the afternoon, exactly from 16:10-approx. 16:40. This was due to a defect in the content Switche. Thank you for your understanding.
Dear customers, We apologize for the extraordinary downtime of some Web presentations on Windows servers, which occurred on 24. 4. 2013 in the morning, exactly from 10:19-approx. 11:15. This was due to a failure of one of the servers. The engineers moved the application to a different server. Thank you for your understanding.
On Monday 4.3.2013. From 08:30 to 09:00 we faced extensive distributed DoS attacks against our customers ' websites. This led to the overloading of the main firewall and due to this there was an unavailability of part of the services and our customer support. We have immediately taken appropriate countermeasures against attacks. At the moment, the situation is stabilized and the services provided are again available in the usual quality.
On 16. 2. 2013 the configuration (NetFlow-IPv6) of the main edge router (network Element) in the primary data center will be done from 00:00 to 02:00. This service window can be used to predict momentable downtime in the availability of our services, but they should not exceed 30 minutes in total. If unforeseen events occur, please refer to this location for more information.
On 14. 2. 2013 the configuration of the main edge router (network Element) in the primary data center will be carried out from 00:00 to 02:00. This service window can be used to predict momentable downtime in the availability of our services, but they should not exceed 30 minutes in total. If unforeseen events occur, please refer to this location for more information.
On 11.1.2013 from 00:00 to 02:00, a reboot will be possible to replace the SAN switch (network Element) in the primary data center within the data storage network. This service window can be used to predict short downtime (in order of units of minutes) in the availability of our services, but they should not exceed 30 minutes in total. If unforeseen events occur, please refer to this location for more information. Thank you for your understanding.